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OPINION  
____________ 
 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Alejandro Lupian, Juan Lupian, Isaias Luna, Jose 
Reyes, and Efrain Lucatero (collectively, “the Drivers”) are 
professional delivery drivers who separately contracted to 
provide equipment and services to Joseph Cory Holdings LLC 
(“Joseph Cory”), a motor carrier and property broker.  The 
Drivers filed a class action complaint alleging that Joseph Cory 
deducted wages from their paychecks without obtaining 
contemporaneous consent in violation of the Illinois Wage 
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Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
115/1–115/15.  Joseph Cory moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 
(“FAAAA”), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569, 1606, 49 
U.S.C. §§ 14501–06, preempts the IWPCA.  The District 
Court, inter alia, denied Joseph Cory’s motion, holding that the 
FAAAA did not preempt the Drivers’ IWPCA claims.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order.     
 
I. 
 
 The contracts between the Drivers and Joseph Cory 
purported to establish that the Drivers would work as 
independent contractors, although the Drivers claim the 
realities of their relationship made them Joseph Cory’s 
employees under the IWPCA.  The contracts expressly 
permitted Joseph Cory to take “[c]hargebacks” for any expense 
or liability that the Drivers had agreed to bear — “expenses 
[that] shall be deducted from the amount of [the Drivers’] 
compensation.”  Appendix (“App.”) 44, 50.  Joseph Cory 
deducted these expenses — including costs for “insurance, any 
related insurance claims, truck rentals, . . . uniforms,” and 
“damaged goods” — from the Drivers’ paychecks without 
obtaining contemporaneous consent.  App. 20.   
 
 The Drivers filed a lawsuit against Joseph Cory in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
claiming, inter alia, that Joseph Cory’s practice of deducting 
wages from their paychecks and those of similarly situated 
employees without contemporaneous consent violated the 
IWPCA’s wage-deduction provision, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
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115/9.1  The Drivers’ complaint alleged a putative class action 
under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. 
L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.), in which the Drivers would be the named plaintiffs.  
Joseph Cory moved to dismiss the IWPCA claims under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the 
FAAAA preempted the IWPCA.  The District Court denied 
Joseph Cory’s motion to dismiss, holding that, on its face, the 
IWPCA’s connection to the FAAAA’s subject matter was too 
attenuated to trigger preemption.  Lupian v. Joseph Cory 
Holdings, LLC, 240 F. Supp. 3d 309, 317 (D.N.J. 2017).2   
 
The District Court certified its order for an interlocutory 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and we granted Joseph 
Cory’s petition to appeal the certified interlocutory order.3  
                                              
1 The complaint alternatively alleged similar violations 
of New Jersey law.  The District Court determined that Illinois 
law applied and dismissed the Drivers’ New Jersey law-based 
claims.  Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings, LLC, 240 F. Supp. 
3d 309, 313–14 (D.N.J. 2017).  On appeal, the parties do not 
disagree that Illinois law should be applied, nor do we.   
2 In addition to dismissing the counts in the complaint 
alleging violations of New Jersey law, the District Court also 
dismissed the count alleging unjust enrichment under Illinois 
law.  The Drivers do not contest these rulings on appeal. 
3 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  This Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which permits 
discretionary interlocutory review when a district judge 
certifies that an order not otherwise appealable “involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
Joseph Cory moved to dismiss the Drivers’ IWPCA 
claim based on federal preemption.  This Court conducts 
plenary review of the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss 
based on preemption.  Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, 
LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2016).  Facts alleged in the 
complaint are accepted as true for purposes of the motion.  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 
 Preemption is an affirmative defense that the defendant 
has the burden to prove.  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 
VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016).  Therefore, Joseph 
Cory has the burden to demonstrate that the Drivers’ state-law 
claims under the IWPCA are preempted.  To prevail on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense,4 
as Joseph Cory seeks to do here, a defendant must show that 
“the defense is ‘apparent on the face of the complaint’ and 
documents relied on in the complaint.”  Bohus v. 
Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 918, 923 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)); 
                                              
from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation.”  
4 It has been suggested that the more appropriate 
vehicles for determining whether a claim is preempted are a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(c) or a motion for summary judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  See In re Asbestos Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d at 133 n.6; Fisher v. 
Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2012).   
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see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Leveto v. 
Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001).  Put another way, 
dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) only when 
“preemption is manifest in the complaint itself.”  In re 
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 822 F.3d at 133 n.6; see 
also Simmons v. Sabine River Auth., 732 F.3d 469, 473 (5th 
Cir. 2013).   
 
 The doctrine of preemption is derived from the 
Supremacy Clause of Article IV of the Constitution, which 
provides that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.”  U.S. Const. art. VI.  Thus, state 
law “which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must 
yield.”  Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).  There are 
three types of federal preemption:  field preemption, implied 
conflict preemption, and — as is relevant here — express 
preemption.  See Kurns v. A.W. Chesterson Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 
395 (3d Cir. 2010).  Express preemption requires a analysis of 
whether “[s]tate action may be foreclosed by express language 
in a congressional enactment.”  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).    
 
 When a federal statute contains a provision preempting 
state law claims that pertain to “areas of traditional state 
regulation” or police power, we apply a presumption against 
preemption.  Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 
449 (1992); see also N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 
(1995).5  Areas of traditional state regulation or police power 
                                              
5 Joseph Cory argues that the Supreme Court no longer 
applies the presumption against preemption in express 
preemption cases, citing language in Puerto Rico v. Franklin 
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include regulation of “the employment relationship to protect 
workers in the State” such as regulation of “minimum and 
other wage laws.”  DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 404 (2012); see also 
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) 
(“[P]re-emption should not be lightly inferred in this area, 
since the establishment of labor standards falls within the 
traditional police power of the State.”).  The Supreme Court in 
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 
considered another issue under the FAAAA preemption clause 
and applied this presumption against preemption, noting that 
its “[p]reemption analysis ‘start[s] with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded 
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.’”  536 U.S. 424, 438 (2002) (quoting 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  To discern 
Congress’s purpose, we look first to the plain language 
employed in the statutory provision at issue,6 and, if necessary, 
                                              
Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).  However, we 
have determined that, because that decision, dealing with a 
Bankruptcy Code provision, did not address claims involving 
areas historically regulated by states, we would continue to 
apply the presumption against preemption to express 
preemption claims.  Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 
F.3d 760, 771 n.9 (3d Cir. 2018).  We note that we would reach 
the same result in this case even if this presumption was not 
applied.   
6  See Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 655; see also 
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 
(2011) (“[W]e ‘focus on the plain wording of the clause, which 
necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive 
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the statutory structure as a whole, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), as well as our “understanding of the 
way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding 
regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law,” 
Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 486.      
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
 Prior to 1978, the interstate airline industry in the 
United States was tightly regulated by the federal government.  
See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–726, 72 Stat. 
731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1.01 et seq. (repealed)); see also 
Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 
190 (3d Cir. 1998).  Congress determined in 1978 that both 
consumers and the economy would benefit from open 
competition in the airline industry, especially in the areas of 
rates and services, and that this could be achieved by economic 
deregulation of the industry.  Taj Mahal Travel, Inc., 164 F.3d 
at 190–91 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (recodified as amended 49 
U.S.C. § 40101)).  As a result, the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978 (the “ADA”), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified 
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, et seq.) was enacted.  See Morales v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) 
(“Congress, determining that ‘maximum reliance on 
competitive market forces’ would best further ‘efficiency, 
innovation and low prices’ as well as ‘variety [and] quality . . . 
of air transportation services,’ enacted the [ADA].” (quoting 
49 U.S.C. App. § 1302(a)(4) & (a)(9))).  “To ensure that the 
                                              
intent.’” (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 
658, 664 (1993))). 
10 
 
States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of 
their own, the ADA included a pre-emption provision, 
prohibiting the States from enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, 
routes, or services’ of any air carrier.”  Id. at 378–79 (quoting 
49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1)).   
 
 The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 
Stat. 793 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), similarly 
deregulated the motor carrier industry, but it did not preempt 
state regulation of the industry.  Over the next fourteen years, 
however, “[s]tate economic regulation of motor carrier 
operations [had become] a huge problem for national and 
regional carriers attempting to conduct a standard way of doing 
business.”  City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 440 (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 103-667, at 87 (1994) (Conf. Rep.)).  Congress 
addressed this concern in 1994 when it enacted the FAAAA, 
which expressly preempted certain state regulation of the 
trucking industry.  The FAAAA preemption provision 
provides, in pertinent part: 
 
a State, political division of a State, 
or a political authority of 2 or more 
States may not enact or enforce a 
law, regulation, or other provision 
having the force and effect of law 
related to a price, route, or service 
of any motor carrier . . . or any 
motor private carrier, broker, or 
freight forwarder with respect to 
the transportation of property. 
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49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).7  This preemption clause borrows 
from the language set forth in the ADA,8 although it does add 
the qualifying phrase:  “with respect to transportation of 
property.”  See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 
251, 261 (2013) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)).  As 
recognized by the Supreme Court, “[t]hat phrase ‘massively 
limits the scope of preemption’ ordered by the FAAAA.”  Id. 
at 261 (quoting City of Columbus, 536 U.S. at 449 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).       
      
2. 
 
 The IWPCA applies to all employees and employers in 
the State of Illinois.  820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/1.  An 
“employee” is defined in the IWPCA as, inter alia, a person 
who is permitted to work by an employer.  Id. 115/2.9  The 
IWPCA creates wage-related obligations for employers, such 
as paying employees within certain time periods, id. 115/3–4, 
paying separated employees, id. 115/5, contributing to 
employee benefit trusts or funds, id. 115/8, notifying 
employees about their rate of pay as well as the time and 
                                              
7 The FAAAA preemption clause contains exceptions 
not relevant here. 
8 Because of the close similarity in language between the 
ADA and FAAAA, courts rely upon interpretations of both 
interchangeably.  Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 
364, 370 (2008).   
9 Exceptions to the definition of employee are also 
included in the IWPCA.  See 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/2.  
Insofar as the Drivers’ allegation that they are employees must 
be accepted as true in considering a motion to dismiss, we need 
not consider these exceptions. 
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location of pay, id. 115/10, and paying damages for failing to 
properly compensate employees, id. 115/14.  The Drivers in 
this case claim that Joseph Cory violated the provision of the 
IWPCA that requires, in pertinent part:    
 
deductions by employers from 
wages or final compensation are 
prohibited unless such deductions 
are . . . made with the express 
written consent of the employee, 
given freely at the time the 
deduction is made. 
 
Id. 115/9.      
     
III. 
 
A. 
 
  The Supreme Court in several decisions has provided 
guidance “to ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted’” by 
the FAAAA.  Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 260 (quoting 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 541).  First, the phrase 
“related to” in the FAAAA preemption clause refers to state 
actions having “‘a connection with, or reference to, airline’ 
prices, routes, or services” of a motor carrier.  Nw., Inc. v. 
Ginsburg, 572 U.S. 284, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430 (2014) (quoting 
Morales, 504 U.S. at 384).  Second, considering the broad 
scope of the preemption clause, “pre-emption may occur even 
if a state law’s effect on rates, routes, or services ‘is only 
indirect.’”  Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 
371 (2008) (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 386).  Third, “pre-
emption occurs at least where state laws have a ‘significant 
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impact’ related to Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emption-
related objectives.”  Id. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).  
Fourth, the FAAAA “does not preempt state laws affecting 
carrier prices, routes and services ‘in only a tenuous, remote, 
or peripheral . . . manner.’”  Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 
261 (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 371).  The Court has noted 
that, for instance, the FAAAA does not preempt state or local 
zoning regulations, id. at 264, and state laws prohibiting 
prostitution, gambling, and “obscene depictions” are too 
tenuous, remote, and peripheral to be preempted, Morales, 504 
U.S. at 390.  
 
 In Taj Mahal Travel, we considered the ADA’s 
preemption clause.  In that case, a travel agency filed a lawsuit 
alleging, inter alia, defamation against Delta Airlines after a 
number of the agency’s customers received letters from Delta 
informing them that their tickets would not be honored because 
they had been reported as stolen and that Delta had not received 
the money that the customers paid.  164 F.3d at 188.  We 
reviewed the background of the ADA and noted that our 
interpretation of the preemption clause began with the 
presumption against preemption of state law.  Id. at 192.  That 
presumption, we acknowledged, rests “on the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”  Id. (quoting Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. at 655).  We then adopted the view “that the 
preemption clause was intended to prevent states from re-
regulating airline operations so that competitive market forces 
could function.”  Id. at 194 (citing American Airlines, Inc. v. 
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).   
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 As a result, in Taj Mahal Travel, we framed the proper 
inquiry as:  “whether a common law tort remedy frustrates 
deregulation by interfering with competition through public-
utility-style regulation.”  164 F.3d at 194; see also id. (“We 
conclude that focusing on the competitive forces of the market 
. . . leads to a more accurate assessment of Congressional 
intent.”).  If a state law does not have such a regulatory effect, 
we determined, then the state law “is ‘too tenuous, remote or 
peripheral’ to be preempted.”  Id. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. 
at 390).  Applying this inquiry, we held that the travel agency’s 
defamation claim was not preempted by the ADA.  Id. at 195.  
We reasoned that “[a]pplication of state law in these 
circumstances does not frustrate Congressional intent, nor does 
it impose a state utility-like regulation on the airlines.”  Id.  We 
concluded that the travel agency’s defamation suit was “simply 
‘too tenuous, remote or peripheral’ to be subject to 
preemption.”  Id.   
 
 In Gary v. Air Group, Inc., we were presented with the 
issue of whether the ADA’s preemption clause barred an 
employee’s wrongful termination lawsuit instituted under New 
Jersey’s whistleblower statute.  397 F.3d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 
2005).  We again considered the purpose of the preemption 
clause and the presumption against preemption, noting that the 
presumption “is particularly apt in the employment law context 
which ‘falls squarely within the traditional police powers of the 
states, and as such should not be disturbed lightly.’”  Id. at 190 
(quoting Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 
1259 (11th Cir. 2003)).  The employer-airline argued that 
Gary’s claim was preempted because his wrongful discharge 
claim was “‘related to’ the ‘service of an air carrier.’”  Id. at 
187 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).  Put another way, we 
considered whether the state law employment claim “ha[d] a 
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‘forbidden significant effect’ upon The Air Group’s ‘service.’”  
Id.  We answered that question in the negative and held that 
Gary’s claim — “properly viewed as comparable to a garden 
variety employment claim,” id. at 189 — was not preempted 
“because its connection to The Air Group’s ‘service of an air 
carrier’, actual or potential [was] simply too remote and too 
attenuated to fall within the scope of the [preemption clause].”  
Id.  In support of our holding, we noted that Gary did not 
interrupt any flights or refuse any assignments and that his 
actions did not result in the potential interruption of service.  
Id.      
  
B. 
 
 We turn to applying the standards set forth above to 
determine whether District Court properly denied Joseph 
Cory’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis that the 
FAAAA did not preempt the Drivers’ claims under the 
IWPCA.  
  
 The purpose of the FAAAA’s preemption clause is to 
prohibit states from effectively re-regulating the trucking 
industry and to promote “maximum reliance on competitive 
market forces.”  49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6).  The preemption 
clause undoubtedly applies, for example, to state laws directly 
restricting types of goods that can be carried by trucks, tariffs, 
and barriers to entry.  But state law may also be preempted if 
it has an indirect effect.  This intent is patent in the FAAAA 
insofar as the preemption clause employs the phrase “related 
to” immediately before “a price, route, or service of any motor 
carrier.”  Id. § 14501(c)(1).  The Supreme Court further 
observed that “state laws whose ‘effect’ is ‘forbidden’ under 
federal law are those with a ‘significant impact’ on carrier 
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rates, routes, or services.”  Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375 (quoting 
Morales, 504 U.S. at 388).  
 
 We cannot say, particularly at this procedural juncture, 
that the IWPCA has a significant impact on carrier rates, 
routes, or services of a motor carrier or that it frustrates the 
FAAAA’s deregulatory objectives.  Joseph Cory argues 
otherwise, contending the impact of the IWPCA is substantial, 
and complains that if this lawsuit is successful, it will permit 
the Drivers to “re-write” their independent contractor 
agreements with Joseph Cory.  Joseph Cory Br. 13.10  It 
                                              
10 Joseph Cory relies heavily upon Wolens, but that 
decision is inapposite to this case.  Wolens involved the state 
consumer fraud and breach of contract claims of consumers 
who participated in American Airlines’ frequent flyer program 
following retroactive changes to the program’s terms and 
conditions.  The Court determined that both categories of the 
customers’ claims related to “rates” and “services.”  513 U.S. 
at 226.  But the Court held that although the ADA preempted 
the state consumer fraud claims, it did not preempt the breach 
of contract claims.  Id. at 228–29.  The Court noted that the 
relevant “distinction [was] between what the State dictates and 
what the airline itself undertakes . . . with no enlargement or 
enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the 
agreement.”  Id. at 233.  Joseph Cory seizes upon a sentence 
from the Brief of the United States in Wolens that “[t]he 
stability and efficiency of the market depend fundamentally on 
the enforcement of agreements freely made, based on the needs 
perceived by the contracting parties.”  Id. at 230 (quoting Brief 
of United States as Amicus Curiae 23).  We agree with this 
unremarkable statement on contract law.  But the present case 
does not involve a breach of contract claim.  Moreover, the 
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contends that adjusting the compensation arrangements with 
their drivers would be disruptive to its business and choice of 
business model and contravene the deregulatory objectives of 
the preemption clause.  For instance, Joseph Cory asserts the 
IWPCA claims will impact its “services” regarding 
transportation of property.  Joseph Cory Br. 22.     
  
 Wage laws like the IWPCA are a prime example of an 
area of traditional state regulation, and we do not lightly 
conclude that such laws are superseded.  Moreover, such laws 
are a part of the backdrop that motor carriers and all business 
owners must face in conducting their affairs.  The IWPCA does 
not single out trucking firms, and it only concerns the 
relationship between employers and employees.  While the fact 
that the IWPCA does not regulate affairs between employers 
                                              
Court in Wolens was careful to frame its preemption discussion 
on breach of contract claims “alleging no violation of state-
imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the 
airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”  
Id. at 228 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Court in Wolens 
was not called upon to address a circumstance, as we are in this 
case, in which a state law imposed an obligation on employers 
unrelated to the provision of services or the relationship 
between a service provider and its customers.  We note 
parenthetically that the Supplemental Appendix in this case 
contains the Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in a 
factually identical case discussed infra, and that brief states that 
“the FAAAA does not preempt [the drivers’] claim that [the 
motor vehicle carrier] violated the IWPCA’s wage-deduction 
regulation . . . under the ‘significant impact’ formulation used 
in assessing the laws at issue in Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375, and 
Morales, 504 U.S. at 309.”  Supplemental Appendix 16–17.  
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and customers is not dispositive, it does demonstrate that the 
operation of the IWPCA is steps away from the type of 
regulation the FAAAA’s preemption clause sought to prohibit.  
We have no doubt that the disruption of a labor model — 
especially after services have been performed — could have 
negative financial and other consequences for an employer.11  
A similar effect could also be experienced by a change in 
zoning regulations, and the Supreme Court has concluded that 
such regulations are not preempted.  See Dan’s City Used Cars, 
569 U.S. at 264.  We reiterate that the phrase “related to” does 
have bounds, and we believe that the IWPCA falls outside 
those bounds.  See id. at 260 (“[T]he breadth of the words 
‘related to’ does not mean that the sky is the limit.”).  Put 
another way, the IWPCA claims here are too far removed from 
the statute’s purpose to warrant preemption.  With no record to 
demonstrate otherwise, we hold that the impact of the IWPCA 
is too tenuous, remote, and peripheral to fall within the scope 
of the FAAAA preemption clause.      
 
 We are persuaded by the decisions of two of our sister 
Courts of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit considered nearly identical facts in Costello v. BeavEx, 
Inc. and concluded, on a summary judgment record, that the 
FAAAA did not preempt the IWPCA.  810 F.3d 1045, 1048 
(7th Cir. 2016).  As in this case, the BeavEx plaintiffs only 
sought remedy for violation of the IWPCA wage deduction 
                                              
11 We note that this case is limited to the issue of wage 
deductions from agreed-upon compensation.  The other 
benefits of the independent contractor model — for example, 
avoiding costs associated with owning and maintaining 
equipment or allowing drivers to choose their own routes and 
hours — remain available to Joseph Cory.  
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provision.  Id. at 1055.  The court determined that, considering 
the limited scope of the IWPCA, its effect is similarly limited 
and, rather than “hav[ing] a significant impact on the prices, 
routes, and services that BeavEx offers to its customers,” id., 
“the impact of the IWPCA is too ‘tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral’ to warrant FAAAA preemption,” id.  BeavEx 
argued that, if the IWPCA were not preempted, it would suffer 
increased labor costs, and that would result in higher prices for 
its customers and would force it to change its business model.  
Id. at 1056.  In fact, BeavEx produced evidence that they would 
have to spend, for instance, an additional $185,000 per year to 
employ a human resources professional.  Id.  The court was not 
persuaded, determining that “the IWPCA regulates the motor 
carrier as an employer, and any indirect effect on prices is too 
tenuous, remote, or peripheral.”  Id. at 1055; see also id. at 
1056 (“We do not see . . . how the increased labor cost will 
have a significant impact on the prices that BeavEx offers to 
its customers.  BeavEx has offered no evidence to persuade us 
otherwise.”).12  The court held that denial of summary 
                                              
12 The BeavEx court noted the IWPCA’s provision 
allowing an employer and employee to “contract around” the 
wage deduction prohibition through the “express written 
consent of the employee, given freely at the time the deduction 
is made.”  810 F.3d at 1057 (quoting 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
111/9).  The court found this significant insofar as the Supreme 
Court in Nw., Inc. held that state law was not preempted if the 
law “permits an airline to contract around those rules.”  134 S. 
Ct. at 1433.  Joseph Cory asserts that Nw., Inc. is inapplicable 
because the IWPCA “permits written consent to comply with 
the IWPCA” rather than permitting parties to contract around 
its requirement.  Joseph Cory Reply Br. 14.  We disagree with 
this characterization of the IWPCA and agree with the BeavEx 
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judgment was appropriate and concluded that “BeavEx has not 
demonstrated to this court that preventing it from deducting 
from its couriers’ wages or the transaction costs associated 
with acquiring consent to do so would have a significant 
impact related to its prices, routes, or services.”  Id. at 1057.   
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Dilts v. 
Penske Logistics, LLC, also considered the scope of the 
FAAAA’s preemption clause.  769 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2014).  
The truck drivers in that case asserted claims under 
California’s meal and rest break statutes against their 
employer.  The court began its analysis of the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment by recognizing that “[w]age and 
hour laws constitute areas of traditional state regulation” and, 
therefore, the presumption against preemption of state law 
applied.  Id. at 643–44.  Applying the standards necessary to 
resolve an FAAAA preemption issue, the court noted that 
“generally applicable background regulations . . . such as 
prevailing wage laws or safety regulations[] are not preempted, 
even if employers must factor those provisions into their 
decisions about the prices they set, the routes that they use, or 
the services that they provide.”  Id. at 646.  Indeed, the 
employer produced evidence that compliance with the meal 
and rest break laws at issue would mean the employer would 
have to raise prices about 3.4% per year.  Id. at 651 (Zouhary, 
J., concurring).  The court reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and held that the FAAAA preemption 
clause did not preempt the California law, reasoning that the 
                                              
court.  Indeed, the Supreme Court focused upon whether state 
law “authorize[d] parties to free themselves from [a 
requirement]” to determine avoid preemption.  Nw., Inc., 134 
S. Ct. at 1432.         
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state law was not sufficiently “related to” motor carrier prices, 
routes, or services.  Id. at 650 (majority opinion).       
  
 Joseph Cory urges that we should follow two cases from 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in which that court 
held state laws to be preempted by the ADA and FAAAA.  
Both cases are distinguishable because they involved state laws 
of a wholly different character than the IWPCA.  The first of 
those cases, DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., involved a 
direct regulation, not an indirect one like the IWPCA.  646 F.3d 
81, 88 (1st Cir. 2011).  DiFiore involved a Massachusetts law 
regulating tipping as applied to Logan Airport skycaps.  The 
court held that the statute was preempted by the ADA because 
it “directly regulate[d] how an airline service is performed and 
how its price is displayed to customers—not merely how the 
airline behaves as an employer or proprietor,” and reversed a 
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.  Id. at 88.  The opinion 
expressly distinguished the regulation in that case from one 
like the IWPCA, noting that “the Supreme Court would be 
unlikely—with some possible qualifications—to free airlines . 
. . from prevailing wage laws[] and ordinary taxes applicable 
to other businesses,” even though “such measures . . . may 
affect fares and services.”  Id. at 87.   
 
 In the second of those cases, Schwann v. FedEx Ground 
Package Systems, the plaintiffs alleged that FedEx 
mischaracterized them as independent contractors when it 
should have treated them as employees, and that this 
mischaracterization violated the Massachusetts Independent 
Contractor Statute (the “MICS”).  813 F.3d 429, 432–33 (1st 
Cir. 2016).  The court, considering the parties’ cross motions 
for summary judgment, held that the FAAAA preempted the 
MICS, basing its holding on the broad sweep of the MICS’s 
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regulation.  The opinion noted that the MICS provided for a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme that would, “in substance, 
bar FedEx from using any individuals as full-fledged 
independent contractors.”  Id. at 437.  Unlike in the Drivers’ 
case, in which the IWPCA regulates only limited aspects of the 
manner in which employees — as defined by that statute — are 
paid agreed-upon compensation, the MICS provided for a 
comprehensive regulatory regime, which the court held would 
result in “interference” with FedEx’s prices, routes, rates, and 
services.  Id. at 438.  The interference, the court determined, 
was not “peripheral” and it “sufficiently” related to FedEx’s 
routes and service, thereby justifying preemption.  Id.; cf. 
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375 (“[S]tate laws whose ‘effect’ is 
‘forbidden’ under federal law are those with a ‘significant 
impact’ on carrier rates, routes, or services.” (quoting Morales, 
564 U.S. at 388)).  The Drivers’ case is different from Schwann 
because the Drivers’ complaint does not show, on its face, that 
the IWPCA is so far-reaching as to meaningfully affect Joseph 
Cory’s prices, routes, rates, or services.  See BeavEx, 810 F.3d 
at 1055 (“Importantly, the [MICS] triggers far more 
employment laws than the employment definition contained in 
the IWPCA.”).  The IWPCA’s limited regulation of ministerial 
aspects of the manner in which employees are paid is different 
in kind from the MICS’s unique, sweeping regulation of 
independent contractors in Massachusetts.13 
 
 In closing, we restate the procedural posture of this case, 
as it is significant.  Joseph Cory moved to dismiss under Rule 
                                              
13 Furthermore, unlike the wage-deduction provision of 
the IWPCA, the Massachusetts law “bar[red] the employer 
from excepting itself . . . by contract.”  Schwann, 813 F.3d at 
433; see supra, note 12.   
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12(b)(6), and it was required to prove the preemption 
affirmative defense based on the face of the Drivers’ 
complaint.  We note that the BeavEx, Dilts, and Schwann cases 
all were decided in the context of a summary judgment record 
and DiFiore with a trial record.  The allegations of the 
complaint and arguments of Joseph Cory do not persuade us 
that the District Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss.  
We conclude that the IWPCA does not have a significant 
impact on carrier rates, routes, or services of a motor carrier 
and does not frustrate the FAAAA’s deregulatory objectives, 
as the impact of the IWPCA is too tenuous, remote, and 
peripheral to fall within the scope of the FAAAA preemption 
clause. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Order of 
the District Court.  
 
